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Abstract
This article develops an econometric model in order to study country risk behavior for
six emerging economies (Argentina, Mexico, Russia, Thailand, Korea and Indonesia),
by expanding the Country Beta Risk Model of Harvey and Zhou (1993), Erb et. al.
(1996a, 1996b) and Gangemi et. al. (2000). Toward this end, we have analyzed the
impact of macroeconomic variables, especially monetary policy, upon country risk,
by way of a time varying parameter approach. The results indicate an inefﬁcient and
unstable effect of monetary policy upon country risk in periods of crisis. However, this
effect is stable in other periods, and the Favero-Giavazzi effect is not veriﬁed for all
economies, with an opposite effect being observed in many cases.
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11 Introduction
How does monetary policy affect country risk? This question has become a central
issue in the current theoretical debate, due to the fact that monetary policies aimed at
ﬁghting inﬂation have been undermined by ﬁscal dominance models, in which country
risk is the base of monetary instability brought about by interest rate increases, having
an adverse effect upon the control of inﬂation.
From this perspective, Favero and Giavazzi (2004) argue that increases in interest
rates have a positive effect on the risk of default on the public debt, thus increasing
country risk, but leading to a vicious circle of increases in interest and debt, making
monetary control unsustainable, implicating a loss of inﬂationary control.
From another perspective, Blanchard (2004) argues that rises in interest rates may
lead to increases in country risk and inﬂation. When the debt is at an unsustainable
level, and when the primary surplus rates are at their limits, the increased risk of de-
faulting on the debt would have a negative impact upon the inﬂux of capital, reducing,
instead of increasing, the capital account balance, triggering exchange rate deprecia-
tion, and consequently, inﬂation. Thus, monetary policy is no longer effective.
Therefore, due to both its ﬁscal effect, as well as the effects upon external equilib-
rium, monetary policy may be considered ineffective against inﬂation, if a restrictive
monetary policy were to lead to a signiﬁcant increase in the level of risk.
On the other hand, Loyo (2004) claims that Blanchard’s (2004) results are overesti-
mated, and that the relation between interest and risk may not be signiﬁcant. Andrade
and Teles (2005) have estimated this relation for Brazil, using a time varying para-
meter model, demonstrating that increases in interest rates tend to reduce, instead of
increase, country risk in Brazil, in spite of a loss in efﬁcacy with regard to this type
policy in periods of crisis.
Therefore, it is essential to investigate the effects interest rates have on country risk
so that the sign and signiﬁcance of this relation may be determined, in order to better
orient monetary policy. This article studies the effects of monetary policy on country
risk in six emerging economies by applying the country beta risk model.
In this regard, Blanchard suggests that the effects of monetary policy on country
risk are not constant in time, since they crucially depend on agents’ perception re-
garding the probability of debt default. In other words, the effect of monetary policy
on country risk may be insigniﬁcant in some periods, and be adverse in others, since
increases in interest rates do not necessarily mean that the risk of defaulting will also
increase, given that the level of indebtedness and its sustainability may not be critical.
In order to better understand this phenomenon, the original model was expanded, with
the use of the Kalman ﬁlter, so as to predict variations in this relation over time.
The following section presents the empirical country-risk model. The subsequent
section presents the results of the standard model, followed by the section in which
the expanded model is presented along with its results. In the last section, concluding
remarks are made.
22 Modeling Country Risk
The starting point for measuring country risk is the use of a ”country beta model ”.
According to this model, country risk reﬂects the relation between stock market returns
in the source country and those of the rest of the world. 1The model assumes the
following form,
Rint = α + βRext + et (1)
where Rint represents the country’s stock market returns, and Rext the stock market
returns of the rest of the world. Also, the parameter β is the base upon which the
country risk is measured, where, when β increases, country risk diminishes, indicating
an increase in returns on the internal market in relation to the returns for the rest of the
world.
It then becomes necessary to model the country risk, and consequently the parame-
ter β, as varying over time, instead of remaining a constant. Therefore, the parameter
β must be considered as a time-varying parameter. This is fully justiﬁed by macroeco-
nomic theory, in which the relation between country risk and/or returns on assets and
macroeconomic variables has become increasingly recognized in the literature.
In this context, Fama and French (1989), and McQueen and Roley (1993), for ex-
ample, point out that the expected returns on assets decisively depend on the behavior
of macroeconomic variables throughout an economic cycle. These results are sup-
ported by those obtained by Dumas (1994), Erb et. al. (1994, 1996a) and Diemonte et.
al. (1996).
In fact, a certain degree of naivet´ e is needed to believe the assertion that agents
would expect that returns on assets would remain indifferent to periods of crisis and
growth during an economic cycle. Therefore, if returns on assets are related to macro-
economic variations, the country risk parameter, β, will tend to vary signiﬁcantly in
time in response to macroeconomic shocks.
Thus, the issue is not whether country risk is endogenous or exogenous with re-
gard to macroeconomic variables, since its endogeneity appears to be well established;
the issue is which macroeconomic variables are able to signiﬁcantly affect country
risk and, above all, how macroeconomic policies affect country risk. The variables
considered in the model are listed in Table 1.
In our model, the variable GOV seeks to verify the sensitivity of the Brazil risk
with regard to the ﬁscal situation of the public sector, i.e., if agents consider that an
increase in public debt suggests an increase in a country’s risk rating. The inclusion of
the variable JUR attempts to reﬂect how country risk is affected by monetary policy,
the variable OIL is a proxy for supply shocks, and the variable RES seeks to detect
how country risk reacts to external shocks and, above all, exchange rate pressure.
1In this model, the Dow Jones index was used to determine the stock returns for the rest of the world,
while the stock market asset returns of the countries studied were determined from the traditional return
indexes, divided by the US dollar exchange rates
3The signiﬁcance and the sign of the coefﬁcients provide information which is fun-
damental to understand how agents perceive country risk in each case. In this regard,
if the coefﬁcient related to the variable JUR were positive, this would mean that an
austere monetary policy would have a positive effect on country risk, indicating that
agents would consider that said policy would not increase the risk of default on the
debt, and also that a high interest rate policy would bolster the credibility of monetary
policy, reducing risk.
If, on the other hand, this variable were signiﬁcant and had a negative sign, it then
may be afﬁrmed that shocks brought about by unanticipated interest rate increases are
adverse, increasing country risk. According to Favero-Giavazzi and Blanchard, this
means that agents believe that this policy increases the probability of debt default. In
this case, monetary policy would be totally ineffective in maintaining country risk, and
may even be harmful, since it would lead to a loss of inﬂationary control, sterilizing
monetary policy.
Reserves may play an important role in determining risk for two reasons: the ﬁrst
regards a ﬁxed exchange rate scenario (as demonstrated by Andrade and Teles, 2005)
in which a drop in reserves would mean an increase in the probability of an exchange
rate depreciation, and thus risk. The second aspect is related to the supply of dollars
on the domestic market, which is simultaneously regarded as a crucial factor affecting
ﬁnancial market risk. Besides, external shocks exert pressure on the exchange rate,
and consequently on the rate of inﬂation, affecting the credibility of monetary policy.
Lastly, the variable GOV is important to determine the extent to which agents are
concerned with the behavior of the ﬁscal fundamentals, thus affecting country risk.
The source of data was the IMF for all cases. All variables are monthly, from
January, 1991 to March, 2005, except data for Korea, which were between August,
1990 and November, 2000, and for Russia, between September, 1995 and February,
2005, due to variable information restrictions. In the case of Thailand, the IMF does
not provide ﬁscal variables, and thus, in this case, this variable was excluded from the
model.
In an efﬁcient market, it is likely that only unexpected shocks upon macroeco-
nomic variables would affect returns, whose relations comprise country risk. Thus, a
sound econometric model is needed to consider the unpredictable components of re-
lated macroeconomic series. Therefore, before series are handled, they must undergo
an ex-ante whitening, by way of a univariate ARIMA process for each one of the indi-
cated macroeconomic series.
In other words, each one of the speciﬁed series must be submitted to the construc-
tion of a ARIMA process by initially observing the possible non-stationarity of the
series and by applying the ﬁrst difference of these if necessary, and then by observing
their autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions. The results of these esti-
mates for the policy variables for each country are listed in Tables 2 to 7. Petroleum
prices underwent the same whitening process.
Thus, once these models are constructed, their residuals are observed, in order to
determine whether they are white-noises. If this hypothesis is conﬁrmed, these residu-
4als are the parts of the series which may be considered totally unanticipated, i.e., they
are the part of the series comprised of unexpected shocks. Hence, these residuals are
the series used in the country risk model. Besides the theoretical advantages provided
by this methodology, there are also clear econometric advantages, such as the station-
arity of the series, which reduces the possibility of a corrupted regression, as well as
multicolinearity.
Thus, the equation to be estimated in order to observe the effects of shocks in
macroeconomic variables upon country risk is given by,
βt = b0 + b1RESt + b2GOVt + b3OILt + b4JURt + ut (2)
where all variables are deﬁned by their unanticipated components, according to the
analysis outlined in the previous section.
It must be pointed out, however, that the direct estimation of this model is not
possible, due to the inexistence of a time series for β. But it is possible to substitute
the above equations in equation (1), so that the country beta model may be speciﬁed
with a time-varying parameter, estimated by,
Rbra = α + (b0 + b1RESt + b2GOVt + b3OILt + b4JURt)Rext (3)
or, by further development,
Rbra = α + b0Rext + b1REStRext + b2GOVtRext + b3OILtRext + b4JURtRext (4)
Therefore, we reach an equation to be estimated with only observable variables.
The estimation of (4) thus allows us to obtain the parameters of equation 2, and hence
the construction of country risk series. In this regard, the estimation of this model
must also consider that the coefﬁcients of the estimated parameters, as well as their
signiﬁcance, may vary in time, as predicted by Lucas’ critique. Therefore, in order to
avoid this theoretical problem, the model was re-estimated using the Kalman ﬁlter, to
analyze the variations of the coefﬁcients of the macroeconomic variables in time.
3 Results
3.1 Country Beta Risk Model
The results of the estimation of equation 4 for the countries analyzed are presented
in Tables 8 to 13. The model was estimated with three different speciﬁcations. One
included all variables, and the other two the variables JUR and GOV, each at a time.
These alternatives are justiﬁed by the possible interdependence between the ﬁscal pol-
icy variables and the monetary policy variable in the same model.
It may be observed that in almost all economies, the rate of returns on international
assets was statistically signiﬁcant, and presented the correct sign, meaning that an
increase in the rate of American returns would bring about a reduction in domestic
5returns, and thus an increase in country risk. The ﬁscal surplus of the government,
represented by the variable GOV, was signiﬁcant in only two cases, and presented the
expected sign in only one. The other variables, such as international reserves and the
price of petroleum, were not signiﬁcant in most cases.
The interest rate presented statistical signiﬁcance in only two cases: Thailand and
Mexico. However, the sign was not maintained in either case, and only in Mexico did
the interest rate lead to an increase in country risk, as predicted by Favero-Giavazzi
and Blanchard. In all other countries this effect was insigniﬁcant or positive, as in the
case of Thailand.
These results raise doubts regarding the validity of the adverse effects of a high-
interest monetary policy on country risk, since the variable JUR is normally insignif-
icant or positive in most cases. Therefore, the effects of a possible ﬁscal dominance
over the monetary authority’s capacity to control inﬂation are undermined. The im-
mediate issue that must be addressed is whether these effects are also ineffective in
periods of crisis. Toward this end, the next section shall develop an expansion of the
original model in order to better assess the behavior of this relation in time.
3.2 Monetary Policy and Country Risk
Considering that the economies chosen underwent successive foreign exchange crises
during the period studied, it is quite possible that the parameters were also subject
to substantial changes during this period. In order to determine the relevance of this,
we estimated the same model using the Kalman ﬁlter, in the speciﬁc case of interest
rates, to determine whether ﬁscal dominance actually took place at any given moment
in these economies. Therefore, the model was re-estimated, and the Kalman ﬁlter
was applied to the monetary policy coefﬁcients, thus obtaining the trajectories of these
parameters. These trajectories are presented in Figure 1.
The interest rate, with the exception of Argentina, had a positive effect on country
risk in certain periods, and a negative effect in others, the latter being particularly
dominant during foreign exchange crises. This is the main reason why, in the simple
model, the interest rate was not signiﬁcant in most cases, which does not mean that
monetary policy is ineffective with regard to country risk. In this context, signiﬁcance
presents an upward trend in this relation, i.e., the relation is signiﬁcant and consistent
in the new model.
However, one event is common to all economies. During the crises, the inverse
relation is intensiﬁed, demonstrating that substantial interest rate increases introduced
during these crises ended up increasing country risk, not reducing it. This took place
duringthe1997AsiancrisisinThailand, IndonesiaandKorea, duringthe1998crisisin
Russia, the 1994 crisis in Mexico and the Argentinean crisis in 2000, for the respective
countries. This evidence apparently conﬁrms the effects predicted by Favero-Giavazzi
and Blanchard for periods of crisis.
In order to support our analysis, a new model was estimated with the JUR variable
phased out, in an attempt to avoid a possible inversion in the causality of the results.
6The results of this alternative version are listed in Figure 2. These results do not sig-
niﬁcantly alter the predictions of the previous model, corroborating the reliability of
the results.
Overall, the results obtained indicate that monetary policy is completely ineffective
in controlling country risk during periods of crisis, although this is not necessarily true
in other periods.
4 Conclusions
The main objective of this article was to investigate the effects of monetary policy
shocks on the country risk of emerging economies (Argentina, Mexico, Korea, Russia,
Thailand and Indonesia). We attempt to determine the extent to which aspects of ﬁscal
dominance, and consequently loss of inﬂationary control by monetary policy mecha-
nisms, are signiﬁcant in emerging economies, and the situations in which they occur.
To achieve this, a country beta risk model was applied and expanded using a Kalman
ﬁlter.
The application of an expanded country beta risk model indicated that monetary
policy is ineffective during foreign exchange crises, but is slightly effective during
periods of normality. This result underscores the propositions of Favero-Giavazzi and
Blanchard, which state that monetary policies based on interest rates normally have
adverse effects on the economy, either due to an increase in debt, or to the worsening
of the country’s risk rating, which is accompanied by a reduction in the inﬂow of
capital, and a subsequent external imbalance.
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Nominal Interest Rate JUR
Fiscal Superavit GOV
Table 2: ARIMA Models to Korea Macroeconomic Series
RES JUR GOV
C 6.90E+08 -0.060093 -3.28E+10




Table 3: ARIMA Models to Russia Macroeconomic Series
RES JUR GOV
C 7.43E+08 21.29535 8.84E+08






Table 4: ARIMA Models to Argentina Macroeconomic Series
RES JUR GOV
C 4.62E+07 -0.10216 -1.97E+08
AR(1) -0.087648 -0.569393 0.141193










Table 6: ARIMA Models to Thailand Macroeconomic Series
RES JUR GOV
C 1.29E+08 -0.065888 -4.01E+08
AR(1) -0.01554 -0.287068 0.17504
AR(3) 0.346387 -0.215855 0.151048
AR(6) -0.20678
AR(12) 0.479235
Table 7: ARIMA Models to Mexico Macroeconomic Series
RES JUR GOV
C 1.94E+08 19.89672 -7.78E+09





11Table 8: “Country Beta Risk Model” to Korea Country Risk
Variables Models
1 2 3
Const 0.833285* 0.828600* 0.827134
Rext -4.07E-05* -3.96E-05* -4.01E-05*
RES ∗ Rext 1.55E-15 1.34E-15 1.16E-15
OIL ∗ Rext 3.57E-06* 3.50E-06* 3.11E-06*
JUR ∗ Rext 1.88E-06 2.05E-06
GOV ∗ Rext 1.47E-18 1.52E-18*
Table 9: “Country Beta Risk Model” to Russia Country Risk
Variables Models
1 2 3
Const 47.06792* 46.77639* 46.99712*
Rext -0.003588* -0.003546* -0.003579*
RES ∗ Rext 9.39E-15 1.76E-14 9.05E-15
OIL ∗ Rext -4.17E-05 -3.11E-05 -4.18E-05
JUR ∗ Rext -5.63E-07 -9.60E-07
GOV ∗ Rext 1.32E-15 1.33E-15
Table 10: “Country Beta Risk Model” to Argentina Country Risk
Variables Models
1 2 3
Const 628.0334* 601.0064* 625.3097*
Rext -0.020265* -0.017762* -0.019932*
RES ∗ Rext 3.67E-12* 3.54E-12* 3.11E-12*
OIL ∗ Rext 0.000292 -1.16E-05 0.000213
JUR ∗ Rext 1.47E-04 1.22E-04
GOV ∗ Rext -5.93E-12* -5.69E-12*




RES ∗ Rext 4.55E-16
OIL ∗ Rext 1.22E-07
JUR ∗ Rext 1.79E-08
12Table 12: “Country Beta Risk Model” to Thailand Country Risk
Variables Models
1 2 3
Const 41.02196* 38.62143* 41.05828*
Rext -0.003352* -0.003019* -0.003360*
RES ∗ Rext 1.08E-13 1.33E-13 9.70E-14
OIL ∗ Rext 4.31E-05 3.65E-05 4.35E-05
JUR ∗ Rext 5.59E-05* 6.02E-05*
GOV ∗ Rext 7.86E-16 9.35E-16
Table 13: “Country Beta Risk Model” to Mexico Country Risk
Variables Models
1 2 3
Const. 225.0106* 223.6372* 218.2188*
Rext 0.027504* 0.027753* 0.028705*
RES ∗ Rext -1.57E-12 -1.66E-12 -9.61E-13
OIL ∗ Rext 0.000608 0.000546 0.000600
JUR ∗ Rext -0.000996* -0.000986*
GOV ∗ Rext -9.77E-14 -8.83E-14
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